China and ASEAN should strengthen the resilience of their comprehensive strategic partnership to maintain regional stability

The year 2026 marks the fifth anniversary of the establishment of the comprehensive strategic partnership between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, at a time when the global order is undergoing the most intense fragmentation since the end of the Cold War. Amid this new period of turbulence and transformation, China-ASEAN relations have not only withstood the test but also demonstrated robust resilience, showing clearer planning, more pragmatic cooperation and enhanced mutual trust. The continued deepening of this partnership reflects both an outcome of upgraded bilateral cooperation and a shared regional choice favoring stability, development and strategic autonomy.

Through institutional alignment and planning coordination, ASEAN and China have crafted a highly predictable blueprint for regional development. The Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (2026-30) explicitly supports ASEAN community building and integration, including efforts toward the ASEAN Community Vision 2045 and its strategic goals, and reaffirms China’s support for ASEAN centrality in the regional architecture and ASEAN-led mechanisms. This demonstrates that advancing relations is not about creating parallel structures but about upgrading cooperation within ASEAN’s established institutional context.

Furthermore, China has aligned its own development planning with regional cooperation. China’s 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-30) clearly calls for expanding high-standard opening-up and promoting the implementation of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area 3.0. By institutionalizing and itemizing their cooperation agenda, both sides have preserved a rare and valuable mid-to-long-term certainty during an otherwise volatile period.

Practical cooperation is increasingly showcasing the deepening of China-ASEAN relations. Politically, China and ASEAN maintain high-level strategic communication through annual leaders’ meetings, while foreign ministers’ meetings, senior officials’ consultations and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus form a multitiered cooperation mechanism. Economically, ASEAN has been China’s largest export market for three consecutive years and its largest source of imports for seven consecutive years. The upgrading of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area to version 3.0 means bilateral cooperation is moving toward higher-level rules connectivity, and it now incorporates emerging fields such as the digital economy, the green economy and supply chain interconnectivity.

On the security front, as of April 18, China and ASEAN had held 54 meetings of the joint working group on the implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, advancing consultations on a Code of Conduct for the waters. In 2025, China mediated the Cambodia-Thailand border conflict, playing a key role through shuttle diplomacy that culminated in the Fuxian consensus. The China-Cambodia-Thailand Track II dialogue has also preserved vital communication channels for the rebuilding of mutual trust. Meanwhile, China and ASEAN countries have carried out efficient joint law enforcement in non-traditional security areas, jointly combating cross-border online gambling, telecom fraud and other crimes, effectively responding to the demand of people in the region for security.

Greater regional trust has become a force behind stronger China-ASEAN relations. According to the State of Southeast Asia: 2026 Survey Report released by Singapore’s ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, trust in China among ASEAN respondents in this survey had reached a historic inflection point since the annual report’s release in 2019, with trust levels (39.8 percent) exceeding distrust for the first time. In hypothetical “taking sides” scenarios, those choosing China (52 percent) surpassed those choosing the United States (48 percent). Among ASEAN’s dialogue partners, China, with an average score of 9.1, remains the most strategically important partner.

The results reflect ASEAN’s recognition of China’s economic performance and policy continuity. It is noteworthy that a clear majority, over half at 55.2 percent, identified “strengthening ASEAN’s resilience and unity” as the primary approach to navigating the competition between the US and China, underscoring that strategic autonomy remains ASEAN’s core principle. In this sense, the key to the continuous deepening of China-ASEAN relations lies in China’s consistent respect for the autonomous demands of ASEAN and joint efforts to expand the region’s stability, development space and institutional resilience.

Both sides face fresh historical opportunities and notable challenges. Over the next five years, China and ASEAN need to seek common ground while shelving and narrowing differences, and find targeted, practical solutions to the difficulties hindering deeper relations.

On the one hand, the State of Southeast Asia: 2026 Survey Report shows that ASEAN’s political concern over the South China Sea situation, at 48.2 percent, has declined, but it remains the top geopolitical issue involving China. In 2026, as conditions for concluding the Code of Conduct become increasingly favorable, all parties must guard against disruptive external interference.

China can also address the South China Sea issue within the broader framework of strategic bilateral cooperation to prevent it from overshadowing overall relations. Functional security projects, such as joint search and rescue exercises and maritime law enforcement capacity building, could help stabilize expectations. In addition, by strengthening China-ASEAN cooperation in the blue economy, including marine fisheries, marine biological resource development and marine renewable energy, the two sides can provide support for the handling of sensitive issues.

On the other hand, the survey shows that 41.9 percent of respondents are confident or very confident in China as a Global South leader. As a natural member of the Global South, China’s positioning consistently aligns with that of other developing countries. In practice, China should focus more on poverty alleviation, climate change and digital transformation through localized and perceptible grassroots actions. For instance, most ASEAN respondents (60 percent) view climate change and intensifying extreme weather events as the most pressing challenge, but their underlying logic differs fundamentally from that of the European Union. Climate change directly affects agricultural output, freshwater security, coastal livelihoods and vulnerable rural groups in ASEAN. Therefore, China should not stop at general discussions of climate issues, but respond to the survival pressures behind them. Only by doing so can China better support the collective empowerment and self-strengthening of the Global South.

Zhai Kun is a professor at the School of International Studies and the deputy director of the Institute of Area Studies at Peking University. Lin Handong is a doctoral student at the Belt and Road Research Institute of Yunnan University and at the Southwest United Graduate School.

The authors contributed this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily. The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

Contact the editor at editor@chinawatch.cn.